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Abstract
This paper analyzes Markovian equilibria in a model of strategic lending where (i) agents
cannot commit to long term contracts, (ii) contracts are incomplete, and (iii) incumbent
lenders can coordinate their actions. The structure of the credit market changes endogenously
over time along every equilibrium path. After a sequence of bad shocks, the borrower in a
competitive market accumulates debt overhang and the incumbent lenders exercise monopoly
power. Even though the incumbents could maintain this power forever, they ￿nd it pro￿table
to let the borrower regain access to the competitive market after a sequence of good shocks.
Equilibria are computed numerically, and their attributes are qualitatively consistent with
numerous known empirical facts on sovereign lending. In addition, the model predicts that a
borrower who accumulates debt overhang will regain access to the competitive credit market
only after good shocks. This prediction is shown to be consistent with data on emerging
market economies.
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1 Introduction
If a borrower accumulates more debt than the maximum surplus that a lender can extract from
her, the borrower will be unable to roll over her debt in a competitive asset market. This is called
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1debt overhang. However, the lenders to whom the debt is owed have incentives to continue to lend,
because further lending may allow them to recover at least part of the debt. In fact, since the
incumbent lenders will not face any competition in the credit market, they may exercise monopoly
power over the borrower. When a lender o⁄ers a contract in a competitive market, he already
anticipates recovering part of his investment from the ability to exercise monopoly power over the
borrower rather than from direct repayment. The goal of this paper is to build a theory around
this observation and explore its consequences.
One consequence is that the structure of credit markets changes endogenously over time: the
borrower has access to competitive credit markets in some periods and is excluded in others.
Furthermore, the time of exclusion from credit markets is potentially long. Indeed, in the context
of sovereign lending, countries often accumulate debts so large that they cannot be rolled over.
Such a country then temporarily loses access to credit markets. After some time, often more than
a decade, lenders renegotiate the size of the debt with the borrower and let the borrower regain
access to competitive asset markets. But later, the country accumulates large debts again, and
the cycle is repeated. These cycles are illustrated in Table 1, which lists the years of defaults of
several Latin American countries.
1824-34 1867-82 1890-1900 1911-21 1931-40 1976-89 1998-2003
Argentina 1830 1890 1915 1930s 1982 2001
Bolivia 1874 1931 1980
Brazil 1826 1898 1914 1931 1983
Chile 1826 1880 1931 1983
Colombia 1826 1879 1900 1932
Costa Rica 1827 1874 1895 1937 1983
Dominican Republic 1869 1899 1931 1982
Ecuador 1832 1868 1911,1914 1931 1982 1999
Guatemala 1828 1876 1894 1933
Honduras 1827 1873 1914 1981
Mexico 1827 1867 1914 1982
Nicaragua 1828 1894 1911 1932 1980
Paraguay 1827 1874 1892 1920 1932 1986
Peru 1826 1876 1931 1978, 1983
Uruguay 1876 1891 1915 1933 1983 2003
Venezuela 1832 1878 1892, 1898 1982
Table 1. Selected Government Defaults and Reschedulings of Privately Held Bonds and Loans,
1820-2003. Source: Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005).
There are numerous historical episodes of debt accumulation and renegotiation, many of them
involving the same countries. One such episode is the 1930s interwar debt crisis. Bolivia, Chile,
2Columbia and Peru defaulted in 1931-1932 and received substantial debt relief through negotiated
settlements as well as market-based buybacks during the 1940-50s.1 Another example is the case
of the Highly Indebted Countries (HICs). This group included several Latin American countries,
among them Bolivia and Peru.2 These countries defaulted at the beginning of the 1980s, and
18 of these countries received substantial debt relief by swapping their debts for Brady bonds in
the 1990s.3 Finally, the most recent example of debt reduction, and the largest in history, is the
Argentine debt-swap deal that closed in February 2005, four years after Argentina defaulted. The
face value of the country￿ s debt was decreased by 70 to 75 percent. Argentina was also one of the
HICs in the 1980s.
The speci￿c model analyzed in this paper is the following. Two lenders compete for a contrac-
tual position with a single borrower. The borrower has a stochastic production technology that
requires investment every period. Each period, each lender o⁄ers contracts to the borrower. A
contract speci￿es a net transfer between the lender and the borrower, and the debt for the next
period. Neither the lenders nor the borrower can commit to multi-period contracts.
After the lenders make their o⁄ers, the borrower chooses a contract or defaults. A borrower
who defaults is excluded from the asset market forevermore. A lender whose contract is accepted
must repay the debt that is owed this period. Notice that if the lender whose contract is accepted
is the same as the one to whom this period￿ s debt is owed, he does not actually have to repay this
period￿ s debt; from his point of view, the debt already accumulated is a sunk cost. This creates
an asymmetry between the incentives of the two lenders when o⁄ering new debt contracts.
The single lender in our model who is in a contractual relationship with the borrower is inter-
preted as the entire group of lenders to whom an accumulated debt is owed in reality. The other
lender is interpreted as the entire group of lenders who have no claims on the borrower. Modeling
the incumbents as a single entity implies that the incumbents can coordinate their actions when
dealing with the borrower. In general, our model should be applied to environments where such
coordination is possible if the borrower accumulates debt overhang. In reality, coordination among
lenders can be di¢ cult to achieve because of a free-rider problem. A single lender might prefer not
to participate in a debt reduction plan if he anticipates that the borrower will fully repay his claim
after she reaches an agreement with the rest of the lenders. Although we recognize the importance
of this free-rider problem, we abstract from it in the current paper.4
Some properties of all Markovian equilibria of this game are characterized. A subgame perfect
1For a discussion, see Jorgensen and Sachs (1989) and Eichengreen and Portes (1989, 1991).
2For a discussion, see Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1990).
3Brady bonds were named after U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, who in 1989 announced a plan encour-
aging debt relief for the HICs.
4This abstraction is consistent with sovereign debt renegotiation made through the London Club or the Paris
Club, as well as with the use of Common Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond issues. The London and Paris
Clubs organize coordination among lenders. The inclusion of CACs allows the terms of contract to change only if
a predetermined supermajority of bondholders consent. For a detailed discussion of these issues see Chapter 1 in
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005).
3equilibrium is Markovian if the actions of the agents depend only on the income and debt of
the borrower. We show that the state of the economy can always be classi￿ed into one of two
regimes: a monopoly regime and a competitive one. If the borrower faces a debt overhang, the
incumbent lender gives a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the borrower. That is, if the debt is larger than
the maximum surplus that a lender can extract from the borrower, the incumbent lender has full
bargaining power and acts as a monopolist. On the other hand, if there is no debt overhang, the
lenders are Bertrand competitors; the contract accepted by the borrower maximizes the borrower￿ s
surplus subject to the condition that the outsider lender makes zero pro￿t.
Our main result is that the state of the economy keeps switching between the two regimes
along every equilibrium path. More precisely: If the lenders are competing at some point of time,
the borrower surely accumulates debt overhang and loses her access to the competitive market
at a future date. Conversely, even if the incumbent has monopoly power over the borrower, the
borrower eventually regains access to competition with probability one. The latter result might
seem surprising at ￿rst. Indeed, if the borrower faces debt overhang, the incumbent lender could
o⁄er contracts that would guarantee him monopoly power forever. We show, however, that after
a sequence of good shocks, the incumbent lender will ￿nd it pro￿table to let the borrower have
access to the competitive credit market again. The intuition behind this result is the following.
The contracts o⁄ered by a monopolist lender are ine¢ cient from the point of view of the borrower.
If the debt is lowered, the borrower has access to a larger set of contracts and can make more
e¢ cient investment decisions. This implies that the borrower￿ s willingness to pay for a marginal
debt reduction exceeds the lender￿ s loss from the same debt reduction. Therefore, after a sequence
of good shocks, when the borrower has enough liquidity to compensate the incumbent lender for
a reduction in the next period￿ s debt, the incumbent will o⁄er a contract that speci￿es a large
immediate payment in exchange for reducing the debt next period. This is a buyback.
This result may be important in the context of sovereign lending. Countries having debt
overhang often lose access to credit markets for several years, sometimes for more than a decade.
The current literature does not provide a satisfactory explanation for this observation.5 The
majority of the literature on debt renegotiation assumes that if there is a debt overhang, the game
is changed, and the parties must engage in bilateral bargaining to reduce debt.6 Since, in general,
there is no delay in bargaining, the debt reduction is immediate.7 In contrast, in our model, the
5For example, in their seminal paper, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) assume that the penalty for default is a
permanent exclusion from future credit. They say that an important elaboration would be to make the time of
exclusion endogenous.
6See, e.g., Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1989), Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), Ozler (1989), and Yue (2005).
7Some papers make time spent outside the credit market exogenously long. In Arellano (2005), a country that
has defaulted can reenter the asset market according to an exogenously given probability in each period. Yue (2005)
assumes that after debt renegotiation (via Nash bargaining), the country cannot access credit markets immediately,
but only after fully repaying the reduced debt. Cole, Dow, and English (1995) get exogeneously long exclusion by
assuming that the borrower￿ s type follows a Markov process. A borrower of a bad type defaults, while a borrower
of a good type makes repayments in order to regain access to credit markets.
4time elapsed from the onset of debt overhang to a buyback is endogenous and potentially long. The
contracting protocol that describes the interaction between the borrower and the lenders in our
game does not change through the play of the game. In particular, it does not depend on whether
there is a debt overhang. The borrower has no access to competitive asset markets in some periods
because new lenders have no incentive to o⁄er contracts. The change in the regime, and hence the
time spent outside the competitive credit market, is merely a consequence of equilibrium behavior.
We identify two sources of ine¢ ciency. When the incumbent lender has monopoly power, he
invests less than the socially optimal amount in general. This is because the lender takes into
account only his own payo⁄ and ignores the borrower￿ s when making investment decisions. On
the other hand, if the borrower has enough liquidity and small debt, she overinvests, because
overinvesting can decrease the probability of liquidity problems and debt overhang in the future.
To investigate time series properties of the model, we numerically compute an equilibrium and
simulate it. Our computational results are qualitatively consistent with many empirical regularities
observed in emerging market economies. In particular, there is a negative relationship between
the level of debt and investment, and investment is lower if there is a debt overhang. Arslanalp
and Henry (2004), Borensztein (1990a), Deshpande (1997) and Fischer (1987) document that the
1980s debt crises in the HICs were associated with a fall in investment, and that investment rose
after the debt reduction deals. In addition, empirical studies including Arrau (1990), Borensztein
(1990b), Deshpande (1997), Fry (1989), and Greene and Villanueva (1991) ￿nd a negative e⁄ect
of debt on investment. These studies are discussed in details in Section 8.
Our computations also suggest that periods of debt overhang are associated with lower income
levels. This is consistent with ￿nding that debt crises usually result in output losses, as suggested
by, for example, Sturzenegger￿ s (2004) growth regressions for developing countries during the 1980s.
Our simulations predict a negative correlation between the borrower￿ s income and the country
interest rate. Studies that report countercyclicality of interest rates on developing countries￿loans
include Cline (1995), Cline and Barnes (1997), Edwards (1984), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and
Uribe and Yue (2003). We also ￿nd a negative relationship between investment and the country
interest rate, as found, for example, by Edwards (1984).
Another prediction of our model is that debt reductions occur after a sequence of good produc-
tivity shocks. We provide empirical evidence that supports this ￿nding. In particular, the average
real GDP growth rate of the Brady countries was 4:1 percent in the last three years before the
debt relief deal, compared with 1:8 percent during the six years preceding those three years. An
even more striking example is the 2005 Argentine debt swap. Real GDP grew at 8 percent in the
last two years before the deal, compared with an average of ￿4:9 percent during the four years
preceding those two years.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The rest of this section reviews related
literature. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 includes preliminary observations and de￿nes
the equilibrium concept and the state space. Section 4 characterizes the value functions. Section
55 contains the main analytical results. Section 6 establishes the existence of an equilibrium. The
computational results are presented in Section 7. In Section 8, we present correlation coe¢ cients
obtained from the simulated time series and discuss empirical evidence consistent with them.
Section 9 concludes. Most of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Related Literature
Our model has many features similar to those analyzed in the corporate debt literature. In
particular, agents are risk neutral, and the motive for borrowing is that the borrower needs to
invest in a stochastic production technology. On the other hand, related papers on corporate
lending usually analyze ex-ante optimal contracts. These papers implicitly assume that contracts
cannot be renegotiated, that is, agents can commit to multi-period contracts.8 Instead, we analyze
Markovian equilibria in a game where new contracts are o⁄ered in every period and agents cannot
commit to long-term contracts. To illustrate the di⁄erences between this literature and our paper
in terms of conclusions, we review a few of these papers.
Thomas and Worrall (1994) and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) study an environment
very similar to ours. The main di⁄erences are that there is only a single lender9 and the parties
can commit to long-term contracts subject to participation constraints in each period. The ex-
ante optimal contract has the following features. The value to the borrower increases and the
value to the lender decreases over time. The reason is that the borrower￿ s participation constraint
is easier to satisfy if payments are delayed. Furthermore, the amount of investment increases
over time, often converging to the socially optimal level. Since we study Markovian equilibria,
and contracts are renegotiated every period, neither the value of the agents nor the amount of
investment depends on time in our model. All of these variables are the functions only of the state
variables: the borrower￿ s income and the debt.
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2002) also analyze lending contracts with limited commitment under
the assumption that the lender does not observe either the use of borrowed funds or the output of
the project. The authors show that the ex-ante optimal contracts have the following feature. There
are two absorbing states: after some time, either the project is liquidated or only the ￿rst-best
investment is made and the lender has no claim on the borrower.10 Liquidation follows a sequence
of bad shocks. A sequence of good shocks results in an increasing path for the borrower￿ s value,
eventually reaching the ￿rst-best social surplus. In sharp contrast with this result, in our equilibria
there are no absorbing states; the economy keeps switching between the competitive and monopoly
regimes. Furthermore, investment is always ine¢ cient.
Another paper identifying ex-ante optimal debt contracts is Atkeson (1991). In his model, the
8Commitment in this literature is often limited, so that contracts must be subject to participation constraints in
each period.
9In Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), there are many competing lenders, but they only force the incumbent
lender to earn zero pro￿t ex-ante and play no strategic role otherwise.
10Quadrini (2004) shows that liquidation of the ￿rm can be a feature of the optimal contract even if renegotiation
is possible.
6lenders do not observe whether the borrower invests or consumes borrowed funds. To provide
proper ex-ante incentives to the borrower, the optimal contract speci￿es a fall in consumption and
investment for the lowest realizations of output. As we mentioned earlier, our model produces a
similar result. If the borrower￿ s income is small and the debt is large, investment is ine¢ ciently
small. However, while in Atkeson (1991) incentives cause this problem, in our model the lender￿ s
monopoly power is to blame.11
Unlike in our model, the majority of the literature on sovereign lending uses consumption
smoothing as a motive for borrowing. See, e.g., Atkeson (1991), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981),
Calvo and Kaminsky (1991), Kletzer and Wright (2000), and Yue (2005). On the other hand,
many papers, like ours, analyze Markovian equilibria in the presence of competitive credit markets,
instead of characterizing optimal contracts.
The majority of the papers on sovereign debt focus mostly on the incentives and welfare of
the borrower, while the creditors only play passive roles. This paper shifts the focus toward the
lenders. A key feature of our model is the dynamics of competition among the lenders resulting
from stochastic productivity shocks. This feature can be crucial in analyzing debt overhangs, debt
roll-overs, and buybacks. A central question of the literature on sovereign lending is whether debt
reductions are socially bene￿cial and whether the borrower or the lender collects the rents from
them. Below, we brie￿ y describe the debate on these issues and the contribution of this paper to
the debate.
Sachs (1988, 1989, 1990) argues in favor of debt reductions. He claims that debt burden
decreases domestic investment, impedes growth, and aggravates economical and political instability.
Krugman (1988b) claims that debt reduction generally bene￿ts both the debtor and the creditors
if the debtor is on the wrong side of the ￿debt relief La⁄er curve￿￿that is, if the nominal debt is
so high that reducing it actually increases the expected payment. Krugman (1988a) ￿nds that if
the debtor can a⁄ect output through a costly e⁄ort, the creditor might ￿nd it pro￿table to forgive
part of debt to increase the likelihood that the country will repay the rest. Froot (1989) argues
that when a country is liquidity constrained, the creditors should combine debt reduction with new
lending in order to stimulate investment, thereby increasing potential future repayments. Calvo
and Kaminsky (1991) study a model in which debt reduction is a feature of the optimal contract
as a means to improve consumption smoothing. Their calibration suggests that small risk premia
could be consistent with relatively large debt reductions.
Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1988), on the other hand, claim that open-market buybacks are likely to
be a poor deal for a debtor country that faces debt overhang because the country simply uses its
scarce resources to subsidize the creditors. This is because a buyback reduces the face value of the
debt but the price of the remaining claims rises. Hence, the actual market value of outstanding
debt changes little, re￿ ecting low market expectations about the country￿ s capacity to repay debt.
11A paper related to investment ine¢ ciencies due to limited enforcement is Marcet and Marimon (1992). Their
computational results suggest that the welfare loss associated to these ine¢ ciencies can be severe.
7The main criticism of Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1988) is that they do not model ine¢ ciencies associated
with debt overhang, such as investment disincentives, limits on future borrowing and loss of access
to credit markets.12 However, Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1991) argue that even if buybacks stimulate
domestic investment, creditors will fully capture the e¢ ciency gain from them.
Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) present a model where only the lenders bene￿t from debt
reductions. In their equilibria, if the borrower cannot service her debt, the lenders o⁄er a deal
that keeps the borrower indi⁄erent between accepting the deal and defaulting. Since the borrower
accepts the deal in equilibrium, all e¢ ciency gains from debt reduction go to the lenders.
This paper￿ s contribution to the debate is the following. Once debt overhang accumulates, it is
socially e¢ cient to reduce the debt instead of letting the borrower default. This is because, despite
the debt overhang, it remains worthwhile to invest in the borrower￿ s production technology. On the
one hand, like Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) and Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1988, 1991), we ￿nd that
only the lenders bene￿t from buybacks ex post.13 The borrower is no better o⁄ accepting a debt
reduction than defaulting. On the other hand, if debt buybacks are possible, the lenders rationally
anticipate that the borrower will not default once debt overhang accumulates. This allows the
lenders to recover at least part of their investments. Lenders o⁄er contracts in the credit market
that re￿ ect these expectations. Since the credit market is competitive to start with, the borrower
then extracts all of the ex-ante e¢ ciency gain from buybacks. Our arguments emphasize that it
is insu¢ cient to analyze environments where debt overhang has already accumulated when one
evaluates the welfare implications of debt reductions and buybacks.
2 The Model
There are three risk neutral agents: a borrower and two lenders. Time is discrete, and all agents
discount the future according to the same discount factor ￿.
Production and Preferences
The borrower has a stochastic technology to transform capital goods into consumption goods.
A production function f and a random variable S describe the technology. If the amount of capital
investment is K, then the borrower￿ s income in the next period, in terms of consumption goods, is
F (K) = sf (K);
where s is the realization of the shock S. The production function is strictly increasing and strictly
concave and satis￿es the Inada conditions. The random variable S is assumed to be distributed
according to cdf G, with positive density g on [0;1]. Capital completely depreciates every period.
12See the discussion in Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1988), Sachs (1988), and Rotemberg (1991).
13It is important to distinguish the buyback mechanism used in this paper from other mechanisms. Bulow and
Rogo⁄ (1988, 1991) consider open-market buybacks, where the face value of debt is reduced by purchasing the debt
at a discount. In our model, a buyback is a reduction in the market value of debt. This is the type of buyback
implemented, for example, by letting the HICs swapping their debts for Brady bonds in the 1990s.
8The lenders can instantaneously transform one unit of capital good into one unit of consumption
good and vice versa. This means the lenders are indi⁄erent between the two goods.14 The lenders
have enough capital to invest in production in every period. Each agent￿ s goal is to maximize the
discounted present value of expected consumption.
Timing and Contracts
Neither the borrower nor the lenders can commit to multi-period contracts. A typical contract
consists of three numbers, (R;K;D0). R denotes the immediate payment from the borrower to the
lender whose contract is accepted, K (￿ 0) is the lender￿ s investment in the production technology,
and D0 (￿ 0) is the next period￿ s debt. More generally, a contract can be a probability mixture
of these triples.15 The simple form of the contract implies that although output is observable,
contracts cannot be conditioned on it.16 In particular, the next period￿ s debt, D0, cannot be
contingent on the realized output.
Suppose that at the beginning of a period, the realization of output is I and the debt is D.
The borrower and both lenders observe I and D. Then the lenders simultaneously o⁄er a set of
contracts to the borrower. The borrower either chooses a contract from these sets or defaults.
(If no contract is o⁄ered, the borrower must default.) If the borrower defaults, she consumes her
current income, I, and the game ends. If she chooses a contract (R;K;D0), she gives R units of
consumption good to the lender who o⁄ered this contract, and the lender invests K units of capital
in the production technology. The lender whose contract is accepted also repays the debt D to
last period￿ s lender.17 The borrower consumes I ￿ R and the new lender consumes R. Then the
period ends.
Since the borrower is risk neutral, R can always be assumed to be deterministic even though
contracts can be random. A contract (R;K;D0) is feasible if R ￿ I. We call a lender the incumbent
at the beginning of a period if the borrower accepted his contract in the previous period. We call
the other lender the outsider.
In reality, a borrower can service her debt if she can partially repay her outstanding debt and
can contract with lenders such that her old creditors get repaid. Hence, the assumption that the
new lender has to pay D to the old one corresponds to the borrower￿ s ability to service her debt.18
14Having two di⁄erent goods ensures that the borrower￿ s continuation payo⁄ upon default is simply her last-
period output. This assumption is not uncommon in the literature. See, for example, Thomas and Worrall (1994).
Although our main results would hold even if there were a single good and the borrower could invest in her own
technology, we have not been able to prove that an equilibrium other than autarky exists in that case.
15Allowing randomization guarantees that the lender has a concave value function, which makes it possible to
characterize some speci￿c features of the policy functions.
16This assumption is often justi￿ed in the literature by pointing out that some shocks are observable but not
veri￿able.
17If the borrower accepts a random contract ￿that is, a lottery over (R;K;D0) triples ￿then the outcome of the
lottery is ￿rst observed.
18We do not allow the borrower to default on old lenders and contract with new ones. Old debts are assumed to
be senior. We want to point out that this type of seniority can be a feature of equilibria without assuming it. That
9One might ask: Why does the borrower not repay D, at least partially? Recall that the borrower
gives the new lender R, which should be viewed as part of the repayment of D.
3 Preliminaries
The First-Best Investment
Since each agent is risk neutral, a social planner would invest such that the discounted present












sdG(s) = 1. (1)
Equilibrium Concept
We restrict attention to Markovian equilibria. To be more speci￿c, we are interested in subgame
perfect equilibria in which the lenders o⁄er sets of contracts that depend only on the borrower￿ s
income, I, and the current debt, D, and in which the borrower￿ s choice of contract depends only
on her income and the set of contracts o⁄ered. In addition, we require that the actual level of
overhang debt has no in￿ uence on the incumbent lender￿ s o⁄ers. That is, if the debt is so large
that the lender cannot recover it (and hence the debt has no real meaning), the set of contracts
o⁄ered by the incumbent lender does not depend on the actual level of the debt; all that matters
is that there is a debt overhang. We lay this out formally below.
In the next sections, we operate under the assumptions that (i) Markovian equilibria exist, and
(ii) autarky is not an equilibrium. We characterize some properties of all Markovian equilibria.
These properties then play an important role in the equilibrium-existence proof in Section 6,
where we also prove that autarky is indeed not an equilibrium. We will not show that there is a
unique Markovian equilibrium in our game. However, all of our results hold for each Markovian
equilibrium.
Fix a Markovian equilibrium and introduce the following notation. WL (I;D) denotes the value
to the incumbent lender at the beginning of a period if the borrower￿ s income is I and her debt is
D. Similarly, WB (I;D) denotes the value to the borrower. Both of these functions depend on the
equilibrium we have ￿xed. We refer to the pair (I;D) as a state.
is, the leders￿equilibrium strategies deter new lenders from o⁄ering contracts to the borrower unless the old lenders
are repaid, see Kletzer and Wright (2000).
10Incentives
Suppose that the borrower￿ s income is I. Then she prefers accepting a contract (R;K;D0) to
defaulting if
I ￿ R + ￿EWB (F(K);D0) ￿ I.19 (2)
The right-hand side of this inequality is the value of default, and the left-hand side is the expected
payo⁄ from accepting the contract. The contract must satisfy R ￿ I to be feasible. The incentive
to accept such a contract is strict whenever (2) is a strict inequality.
The outsider lender is willing to o⁄er only those contracts under which his expected payo⁄
is large enough to cover the current debt, D, that he must pay to the incumbent lender. The
following constraint describes these contracts:
R + E
￿
￿K + ￿WL (F (K);D0)
￿
￿ D, (3)
where R ￿ I. The left-hand side of the inequality is the outsider lender￿ s expected payo⁄ if the
borrower accepts his contract. The right-hand side is the required payment to the incumbent.
If the outsider lender o⁄ers a contract satisfying (3), then it would also be pro￿table for the
incumbent lender to o⁄er the same contract. This is because if the incumbent o⁄ers this contract
and it is accepted, his payo⁄is the left-hand side of (3), while his payo⁄otherwise is the right-hand
side. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume throughout the paper that the incumbent
lender￿ s contract is always the one accepted along the equilibrium path.20 Most of our proofs use
the following argument: A contract cannot be an equilibrium contract if the outsider lender can
o⁄er a contract that is strictly preferred and accepted by the borrower and hence the outsider
becomes the incumbent.
D may be so high that no feasible contract can satisfy (2) and (3) simultaneously. In such a
situation, the outsider lender cannot o⁄er any contract that both guarantees him a non-negative
payo⁄ and is acceptable to the borrower. However, the incumbent lender may still be willing to
o⁄er a contract even if D cannot be fully recovered: The incumbent￿ s payo⁄ from an accepted
contract is the left-hand side of (3), and whenever this quantity is positive, the incumbent has the
incentive to o⁄er a contract. This observation is central to our results. The current debt, D, is
sunk cost to the incumbent but limits the outsider￿ s ability to o⁄er contracts.
Debt Overhang and the State Space
Let V L (I) and V B (I) denote the value to the incumbent lender and the borrower, respectively,
conditional on the outsider lender o⁄ering no contract. Notice that V L (I) is the maximum payo⁄
the incumbent can achieve if the income of the borrower is I, that is V L (I) = supD WL (I;D).
The reason is the following. Suppose that the borrower￿ s income is I. If the outsider o⁄ers no
contract, the incumbent can o⁄er the same set of contracts to the borrower as the one o⁄ered at
state (I;D). The borrower accepts the same contract as the one when the debt is D because her
20Ponzi games are automatically excluded by this assumption.
11decision depends only on the set of o⁄ered contracts. This shows that V L (I) ￿ WL (I;D). If the
debt is very large, say larger than the ￿rst-best social surplus, then the outsider has no incentive
to o⁄er contracts. Hence, there is a D such that V L (I) = WL (I;D). We refer to V L and V B as
monopolistic value functions.
If the debt exceeds V L (I), it is so high that the lender can never extract full repayment from
the borrower in the future. Therefore, the outsider lender cannot o⁄er a contract that is acceptable
to the borrower and that would make it pro￿table to repay the debt to the incumbent.
De￿nition 1 A borrower with income I and debt D faces debt overhang if D ￿ V L (I).
Whether the borrower faces debt overhang depends not only on her income and debt but also
on the equilibrium actually played, because V L (I) depends on actions to be taken in the future.
Whenever D ￿ V L (I), the incumbent lender￿ s payo⁄ is V L (I). He might be able to achieve
this payo⁄by o⁄ering di⁄erent sets of contracts providing the borrower with di⁄erent continuation
values. The set of contracts o⁄ered by the lender potentially depends on the actual level of debt.
But this would mean that although the lender faces the same environment from the point of
view of payo⁄ relevant variables, his actions depend on the history of debt accumulation. Hence,
corresponding to the notion of Markovian equilibrium, we restrict attention to strategies such that
whenever D1 > D2 ￿ V L (I), the lenders o⁄er the same contracts to the borrower when the debt
is either D1 or D2. Therefore, to describe an equilibrium one must de￿ne the strategies of the
players only on the set
￿
(I;D) : D ￿ V L (I)
￿
. We refer to this set as the state space.
Market Structure
In what follows, we show that the contracting protocol in our game implies perfect competition
if D < V L (I) and monopoly power for the incumbent lender if D ￿ V L (I).
If the borrower could o⁄er a contract to the lenders subject to the constraint that the current
debt D must be paid to the incumbent lender, her maximization problem would be:
max
R;K;D0 I ￿ R + ￿EWB (F(K);D0) (4)
subject to (3). We show below that if D < V L (I), the contract accepted by the borrower solves
this constrained maximization problem. In addition, (3) holds with equality, which means the
incumbent lender cannot have a larger payo⁄ than D at state (I;D). This means that whenever
there is no debt overhang, the lenders are Bertrand competitors.
On the other hand, if D ￿ V L (I), we will show that the incumbent lender can give a take-it-
or-leave-it o⁄er to the borrower. Thus the contract accepted in equilibrium solves the following
maximization problem:
max
R;K;D0 R + E
￿
￿K + ￿WL (F(K);D0)
￿
(5)
subject to (2). This implies that whenever the borrower faces debt overhang, the incumbent lender
has monopoly power.
The following proposition lays this out formally.
12Proposition 1 Suppose that the income of the borrower is I, the debt is D, and the equilibrium
contract is (R￿;K￿;D￿). Then
(i) If D < V L (I), then (R￿;K￿;D￿) solves (4) subject to (3), and (3) holds with equality.
(ii) If D ￿ V L (I), then (R￿;K￿;D￿) solves (5) subject to (2).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 suggests that the borrower may want to avoid debt overhang because the incum-
bent, not the borrower, will make decisions if D ￿ V L (I). From the borrower￿ s point of view,
these decisions may well be ine¢ cient. We will show that this in fact happens in every equilibrium.
According to Proposition 1, the economy is always in one of two regimes. The proposition does
not imply, however, that the economy keeps switching between these two regimes. The main result
of this paper is that, in fact, it does.
Also notice that although Proposition 1 makes a sharp distinction between the case when
D ￿ V L (I) and the case when D < V L (I), it turns out that the borrower becomes continuously
worse o⁄ as the debt D increases. This is because the set of available contracts satisfying equation
(3) shrinks continuously as D gets larger.
4 The Value Functions
This section characterizes the value functions. First, we describe some properties of the lender￿ s





as a function of V L, we fully characterize the monopolistic value function of the borrower, V B.
Finally, we establish a dual relationship between V B and WB. Our strategy is to express all of
the value functions in terms of V L. This will play an important role in establishing the existence
of an equilibrium. (See Section 6.)
4.1 The Value Functions of the Incumbent
The next lemma describes some attributes of the function V L.
Lemma 1 The function V L has the following attributes:
(i) V L is increasing,
(ii) if ￿ > 0, then V L (I + ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ V L (I) for all I, and
(iii) V L is concave.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The value to the monopolist incumbent is weakly increasing in the borrower￿ s income, because the
more income the borrower has, the more surplus can be extracted from her. This shows part (i).
Part (ii) means that the slope of the function V L is (weakly) less than one. If the borrower￿ s income
is I, the incumbent can give ￿ units of consumption good to the borrower, and then o⁄er the same
13contract as the one at I+￿. The incumbent￿ s payo⁄from this contract is V L (I + ￿)￿￿. Of course,
the lender might be able to o⁄er a contract that provides him with an even higher payo⁄, hence
V L (I) ￿ V L (I + ￿) ￿ ￿. Part (iii) is merely a consequence of the possibility of random contracts.
Next, we characterize WL in terms of V L.





Proof. See the Appendix.
The argument of the proof is the following. If D ￿ V L (I), the lender acts as a monopolist, in
which case his payo⁄is V L (I). If D < V L (I), he faces competition from the outsider. In this case,
the incumbent cannot o⁄er a contract that the borrower accepts and that generates a payo⁄higher
than D. Otherwise, the outsider could o⁄er essentially the same contract with a slightly smaller
immediate repayment R. The borrower would strictly prefer and accept the outsider￿ s contract,
showing that the incumbent￿ s payo⁄ cannot exceed D.
Next, we characterize the monopolist￿ s capital investment K0 when I = 0 in terms of V L.
Computing K0 is important for two reasons. First, we will show that the monopolist incumbent
invests K0 not only at I = 0 but also at a large range of other income realizations. Second, K0
plays an important role in the characterization of the borrower￿ s monopolistic value function, V B.




, the lender￿ s maximization problem is
max
K
￿K + ￿EWL (F (K);D0).
Since I = 0, the borrower accepts any contract specifying K > 0. This is because at I = 0 her
default option is zero, and if K > 0, with probability one her income in the next period is positive.
Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint, (2), is automatically satis￿ed. Since the contract
will be accepted anyway, Proposition 2 implies that the incumbent is (weakly) better o⁄specifying
D0 = V L (f (K)). That is, the borrower has no access to the competitive market in the next
period, no matter what the realization of her income is. Therefore, the maximization problem of






V L (sf (K))dG(s). (6)
Next we show that
R 1
0 V L (sI)dG(s) is concave in I.
Claim 1 Suppose v is a concave function de￿ned on [0;1). Then
R 1
0 v (sI)dG(s) is also concave
in I on [0;1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The previous claim and the strict concavity of f imply that the maximization problem (6) has a
unique solution, K0, and can be characterized by the following ￿rst-order condition corresponding
to (6):
1 = ￿f0 (K0)
Z 1
0
V L0 (sf (K0))sdG(s). (7)
14Also notice that K0 is strictly positive if autarky is not an equilibrium, that is, when V L is not
constant zero.




V L (sf (K))dG(s)
is strictly increasing on [0;K0] and strictly decreasing on [K0;1).
4.2 The Value Functions of the Borrower









, the equilibrium contract is
￿
0;K0;V L (f (K0))
￿
. Hence,
V B (0) = ￿
Z 1
0
V B (sf (K0))dG(s), (8)
because the right-hand side is the expected discounted payo⁄ of the borrower from the contract
￿
0;K0;V L (f (K0))
￿
.
The next lemma characterizes the value function of the borrower under monopoly power.
Lemma 2
V B (I) =
(
V B (0) if I < V B (0);
I otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As we have shown, if the borrower has no income (I = 0) the monopolist lender￿ s investment,




. That is, V B (0) > 0.
Therefore, whenever I < V B (0), the monopolist can o⁄er the same contract as the one at I = 0,
except that R = I. The borrower strictly prefers accepting this contract to defaulting since it
guarantees a payo⁄ of V B (0)(> I). This shows that V B (I) = V B (0) whenever I < V B (0).
If I ￿ V B (0) the monopolist lender always o⁄ers a contract that makes the borrower exactly
indi⁄erent between accepting the contract and defaulting. Since the borrower￿ s value of default is
I, this implies that V B (I) = I.
By (8) and Lemma 2, V B (0) is de￿ned by the following equation:









The previous equation, (7) and Lemma 2 enable one to determine V B as a function of V L.
The following proposition establishes the relationship between the functions WB, V B and V L.
Proposition 3 Suppose D < V L (I). Then
WB (I;D) = V B (I0);
where I0 solves
V L (I0) ￿ D = I0 ￿ I. (10)
15Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 1 represents the statement of Proposition 3 graphically. The state space
n￿
e I; e D
￿





and the current state of the economy (I;D); are depicted on the bottom panel. To ￿nd the value
to the borrower at (I;D), we draw a 45 degree line through the point (I;D) until it intersects




, that is WB (I;D) = V B (I0).
Monopolistic value function
 of the borrower, V
B(I)
Monopolistic value function















Figure 1. Competitive value functions.
The argument of the proof is based on establishing a dual relationship between the borrower￿ s





Recall from Proposition 1 that the borrower￿ s maximization problem at (I;D) is
max
(R;K;D0)
I ￿ R + ￿EWB (F (K);D0)
s.t. D = R + E
￿
￿K + ￿WL (F (K);D0)
￿
:
Suppose that (R￿;K￿;D￿) solves this problem. After substituting D from the previous constraint
16into (10), we get
V L (I0) = R￿ + [I0 ￿ I] + E
￿
￿K￿ + ￿WL (F (K￿);D￿)
￿
:





. (This contract satis￿es the incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower, (2).)
Essentially, the maximand in the borrower￿ s optimization problem at (I;D) becomes the constraint




, and the constraint of the borrower becomes
the maximand of the lender￿ s problem. This shows the dual relationship between the constrained





An immediate consequence of the previous proposition is that the borrower￿ s value is constant
along the 45-degree line segment drawn in the bottom panel of Figure 1, which is de￿ned as n￿
e I; e D
￿
2 R2




; e I ￿ I = e D ￿ D
o
. In other words, as long as the borrower does not
face a debt overhang, her value depends only on her net position, that is, on the di⁄erence between
her income and debt. More precisely, if D1 ￿ V L (I1); D2 ￿ V L (I2) and I1 ￿D1 = I2 ￿D2, then
WB (I1;D1) = WB (I2;D2).
Let H (I ￿ D) denote the value to the borrower facing no debt overhang if her income is I and
her debt is D. By Proposition 3,




where Q(I0) = I0 ￿ V L (I0).
Indi⁄erence Curves
Figure 2 depicts indi⁄erence curves of the lender and the borrower on the (I;D) plane. The
black lines plot the V L (I) curve, which divides the plane into two regions,
￿




(I;D) : D < V L (I)
￿
: In the region where D ￿ V L (I), the indi⁄erence curves of both agents
are vertical, since the actual level of debt overhang is irrelevant. By Lemma 2, when D ￿ V L (I)
and I ￿ V B (0), the borrower￿ s payo⁄ is constant at V B (0). This corresponds to the shaded area
on the right panel. Similarly, to the right of the point where V L (I) becomes ￿ at, the value to the
lender is constant (see the left panel). In the next subsection, we show that such a point indeed
exists. Since WL (I;D) = D whenever D < V L (I) (see Proposition 2), the indi⁄erence curves of
the lender are horizontal below the V L (I) curve. By Proposition 3, in D < V L (I) region, the
borrower￿ s value depends only on her net position I ￿ D, and hence her indi⁄erence curves are
45-degree lines.






Figure 2. Indi⁄erence curves.
4.3 Marginal Values
In this subsection, we turn our attention to characterizing the marginal values of income to the
borrower and to the lender. Identifying these marginal values is crucial because they determine
investment decisions and hence social welfare. We show that the marginal value of income to the
borrower is larger than one if there is no debt overhang. We also prove that the marginal value of
income to the monopolist incumbent is strictly smaller than one if the income of the borrower is
su¢ ciently large.
Lemma 3 If D < V L (I); then
H0 (I ￿ D) =
1
1 ￿ V L0 (I0)
￿ 1; (12)
where I0 is de￿ned by (10). Furthermore, H is concave.
Proof. See the Appendix.
H0 (I ￿ D) is the marginal value to the borrower of an additional unit of income in state (I;D).
Recall from Lemma 1 that V L0 2 [0;1], which implies that H0 ￿ 1. Since the borrower can always
consume the additional unit of consumption good, the marginal value is obviously at least one.
The more interesting observation is that whenever V L0 > 0, the marginal value is strictly bigger
than one. The reason is that the borrower can use the additional income to reduce her debt.
Reducing the debt gives the borrower access to a larger set of contracts, which allows her to make
more e¢ cient decisions. Hence, the borrower wants to reduce her debt as fast as possible.21 The
goal of the rest of this section is to characterize the set of income realizations for which V L0 < 1.
21If the borrower could save, she would do so to avoid debt accumulation. Given our game, D0 ￿ 0 since the
lenders would default on any positive saving. Our results would hold even if we assumed that the lenders could not
default on savings, as long as there were an upper bound on how much the borrower could save. (Without a bound
equilibrium would not exist.) If the borrower were risk averse, our results would hold even without this bound.
18Suppose that the borrower has no debt and that her income is so high that it does not constrain
her when she decides how much capital to buy. Then her maximization problem becomes
max
(R;K;D0)
￿R + ￿EWB (F (K);D0)
s.t. R = E
￿
K ￿ ￿WL (F (K);D0)
￿
.





￿WL (F (K);D0) + ￿EWB (F (K);D0) ￿ K
￿
.
From Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 it follows that WL
2 + WB
2 ￿ 0, and hence the borrower always








The ￿rst-order condition is
￿1 + ￿f0 (K)
Z 1
0
H0 (sf (K))sdG(s) = 0. (13)
Since H is concave (see Lemma 3), by Claim 1 the second-order condition is automatically satis￿ed.










= 1 if I ￿ V B (0);





= 0 if I ￿ IM;
and H0 (I ￿ D) > 1 whenever H (I ￿ D) is strictly smaller than IM. Furthermore, H0 (0) > 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.





it speci￿es R = I instead of zero. That is, if the borrower￿ s income increases by a dollar, the
value to the lender also increases by a dollar because, by increasing the immediate repayment, he
fully extract the additional income from the borrower. This shows that V L0 = 1 and R(I) = I




. If the borrower￿ s income increases by a
dollar, the lender still wants to extract the increase from the borrower via an increase in the
immediate repayment, R. However, since I > V B (0), unlike in the previous case, the increase
in the repayment comes at a cost for the lender. In order to satisfy the incentive constraint of
the borrower, the lender must compensate her for a larger repayment by either increasing the
capital investment or decreasing the debt in the next period. Hence, the lender￿ s continuation





I ￿ IM, the lender no longer has an incentive to extract an increase in the borrower￿ s income.




is already so high that its
marginal product is very small. Furthermore, the next period￿ s debt is already zero, so the lender
cannot compensate the borrower by reducing D0. Therefore, whenever I ￿ IM, the lender o⁄ers




, which shows that V L0 = 0 and R(I) = IM.







I if I < IM;
IM otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5 Main Results
Ine¢ cient Investments
Since each agent in our model is risk neutral, any welfare loss is due to ine¢ cient investments.
The next theorem identi￿es two sources of ine¢ ciency.
Theorem 1 The monopolist lender invests too little if the borrower has low income. The borrower
invests too much if she has small debt and high income. Formally:
K0 < KFB < KM.
Proof. First, we show that KFB < KM. Notice that (12) implies
Z 1
0




The inequality is strict because H0 (0) > 1, by Lemma 4. Therefore
0 = ￿1 + ￿
Z 1
0




The previous inequality together with (1) implies KM > KFB.
Second, we show that K0 < KFB. From Lemma 4,
Z 1
0




The inequality is strict because f (K0) > V B (0) (for otherwise the borrower would never consume).
Therefore
0 = ￿1 + ￿
Z 1
0




20which together with (1) implies K0 < KFB.
The intuition behind these results is the following. If I = 0, the borrower cannot compensate
the monopolist lender by up-front payments for his investments. The lender￿ s investment decision
is driven by his ability to extract the next period￿ s income from the borrower. Since the borrower
controls the income, the lender can extract it only at a cost. Hence, the marginal value of income
for the monopolist is less than one, and thus he invests too little. On the other hand, if the
net income of the borrower is high (I ￿ D > KM), the borrower overinvests. This is because,
by overinvesting, the borrower can reduce the probability of debt overhang. The borrower wants
to do so because she anticipates that if there is debt overhang, the incumbent lender will invest
ine¢ ciently little.




and the lender has monopoly power. Investment KM is made if the net income of the
borrower, I￿D, lies in the interval [KM;1). We conjecture, but can show only by numerical com-
putations, that in general the investment is positively correlated with income. Our computational
results are reported in Section 7.
Atkeson (1991) also shows that investment is ine¢ ciently small for the lowest realizations of
output. However, in his model, a moral hazard problem generates this result. The lender does not
observe whether the borrower invests or consumes the borrowed funds. The investment is small if
the realized income is small, because this provides proper ex-ante incentives for the borrower.
Welfare Analysis
Recall that if D ￿ V L (I), the value to the borrower is H (I ￿ D) and the value to the lender
is exactly D. Thus the social surplus at state (I;D) is H (I ￿ D) + D.
Theorem 2 (i) Suppose V L (I) ￿ D1 > D2. Then
H (I ￿ D1) + D1 ￿ H (I ￿ D2) + D2.
Furthermore the inequality is strict whenever H (I ￿ D2) < IM.
(ii) Suppose that I1 > I2 and V L (I1) ￿ D. Then
H (I1 ￿ D) + D ￿ H (I2 ￿ D) + D + [I1 ￿ I2]:
Furthermore, the inequality is strict whenever H (I1 ￿ D) < IM.
Proof. It follows from (12) and Lemma 4 that
@H (I ￿ D)
@I
= ￿
@H (I ￿ D)
@D
￿ 1,
with strict inequality whenever H (I ￿ D) < IM. Therefore,
@H (I ￿ D) + D
@D
= 1 ￿ H0 (I ￿ D) ￿ 0,
21with strict inequality whenever H (I ￿ D) < IM. This proves part (i). Furthermore,
@H (I ￿ D) + D
@I
= H0 (I ￿ D) ￿ 1;
with strict inequality whenever H (I ￿ D) < IM; showing part (ii).
The amount of debt D is not part of the physical environment. Hence, in a ￿rst-best world,
where there are no commitment problems, the debt cannot have any e⁄ect on social surplus.
E¢ ciency therefore requires that investment decisions do not depend on the debt D. According
to part (i), an increase in debt decreases social welfare in our model. This is because a larger debt
implies less e¢ cient investment decisions.
The second part of the theorem says that, in general, an increase in the borrower￿ s income I
increases the social surplus by more than the increase in I. The intuition is the same as before:
The borrower￿ s value increases by more than the increase in her income because she can use the
additional income to repay debt and avoid debt overhang.
Fluctuating Market Structures
In the next theorem, we show that the structure of the credit market keeps changing over time.
Theorem 3 (i) Suppose that the borrower faces a debt overhang. Then there is surely a future
date at which the borrower regains access to the competitive credit market. More precisely: Suppose
that at time t the economy is at state (It;Dt) and Dt ￿ V L (It). Then, with probability one, there
is a future date, ￿, at which the economy is at state (I￿;Dt) such that D￿ < V L (I￿).
(ii) Suppose that the borrower has access to the competitive credit market. Then there is surely
a future date at which the borrower faces a debt overhang. More precisely: Suppose that at time
t the economy is at state (It;Dt) and Dt < V L (It). Then, with probability one, there is a future
date, ￿, at which the economy is at state (I￿;Dt) such that D￿ ￿ V L (I￿).
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the borrower faces debt overhang, the incumbent lender acts as a monopolist. Clearly,
the incumbent lender could o⁄er a sequence of contracts that would guarantee him monopoly
power forever no matter what shocks were realized.22 The ￿rst part of the theorem says that
the incumbent does not ￿nd such a sequence of contracts to be optimal; after a while, he o⁄ers
a contract that gives the borrower access to the competitive market next period with positive
probability. The incumbent lender sometimes speci￿es the next period￿ s debt such that, at least
in high-income states, the borrower will not face debt overhang.
The argument for this result is the following. Suppose that the lender never allowed the borrower
to return to the competitive market. Then, at least in some states, the borrower￿ s consumption
would be positive, i.e., the optimal contract would specify R < I. Otherwise, the borrower would
22This is because the monopolist lender can always o⁄er a contract
￿
R;K;V L (f (K))
￿
that the borrower






;K0;V L (f (K0))
￿
.
22default whenever I > 0. On the other hand, the borrower￿ s gain from a marginal debt reduction
exceeds the lender￿ s loss. (See Proposition 2 and Lemma 3.) Since R < I, the borrower has
liquidity to compensate the lender for a debt reduction. Hence, the monopolist incumbent would
be better o⁄increasing R and decreasing next period￿ s debt, D0. Hence, R < I cannot be speci￿ed
in the optimal contract, a contradiction.
Another way to understand why the monopolist incumbent lets the borrower have access to
competitive markets is the following. The most e¢ cient way to extract surplus from the borrower
is to guarantee e¢ cient investment decisions to her. If the lender could commit to multi-period
contracts, he would promise to invest e¢ ciently in the future in exchange for large immediate
repayments. Unfortunately, such promises are not credible because of the lack of commitment.
However, by lowering the next period￿ s debt, the incumbent provides the borrower with access to
the competitive market with positive probability. In the competitive market, the borrower can
make more e¢ cient investment decisions. Lowering the next period￿ s debt serves as a commitment
device for the incumbent. It can be viewed as a credible promise of the incumbent to invest
e¢ ciently in the future.
Part (ii) says that debt overhang occurs with probability one. This is because, with probability
one, the borrower is hit by a sequence of bad shocks. Along that sequence, arbitrarily large debts
can accumulate.
From the proof of the theorem, the following remark follows.
Remark 2 If the borrower accumulates debt overhang, she regains access to the competitive credit
market only after the realization of a sequence of good shocks.
Buyback Boondoggle
As we mentioned in the introduction, several papers argue that borrowers do not bene￿t from
organized buybacks. For example, Bulow and Rogo⁄(1988) report the following episode. In March
1988, Bolivia￿ s foreign commercial bank debt was selling at a mega-discount, about 6 cents on the
dollar. Benefactors donated several million dollars to the Bolivian government for purposes of
repurchasing part of the debt at these secondary market prices, which would allow the government
to retire nearly half of the nominal value of the debt. However, after the repurchase, the secondary
market price on the remaining debt rose to 11 cents, and as a result, the market value of the total
debt remained practically unchanged. That is, the burden of the Bolivians￿external debt was no
lower, and the buyback was just a transfer to the creditors. Bulow and Rogo⁄ (1988) call this
phenomenon a buyback boondoggle.
There are two ways to explain this phenomenon in our model, depending on whether the transfer
from a third party is targeted at reducing debt directly or at increasing the borrower￿ s income.23
Suppose that the borrower accumulated debt overhang, that is, D ￿ V L (I). First, assume that
a third party unexpectedly reduces the debt by an amount less than D ￿ V L (I). Since the new
23We are grateful to Casey Mulligan for drawing our attention to this observation.
23debt still exceeds the maximum surplus that can be extracted from the borrower, V L (I), the debt
reduction is simply a transfer to the incumbents, but has no impact on the borrower￿ s welfare.
The borrower￿ s payo⁄ is V B (I) before as well as after the debt reduction. Second, suppose that
I < V B (0), and the donation increases the borrower￿ s income by less than V B (0) ￿ I. Since the




(see Lemma 2), the borrower does not bene￿t from
the transfer. The monopolist lender extracts the transfer from the borrower via an increase in R
without changing the continuation payo⁄ of the borrower.
A shortcoming both of the analysis above and of Bulow and Rogo⁄(1988) is that they consider
only what happens after debt overhang accumulates. Although the borrower might not bene￿t
from buybacks ex-post, third-party transfers still have an impact ex-ante. The contracts o⁄ered
in the competitive credit market will re￿ ect the lenders￿anticipation of such transfers. Since the
credit market is competitive, the borrower extracts all of the surplus from buybacks ex-ante.
6 The Fixed-Point Theorem
We have not yet shown that a Markovian equilibrium exists in our game. Notice that by Proposi-
tions 2 and 3, it is enough to characterize the monopolistic value functions. These results imme-
diately deliver the competitive value functions. Also notice that from (7), (8) and Lemma 2, the
monopolistic value function of the borrower can be deduced from the monopolistic value function
of the lender.
Recall that the lender￿ s payo⁄ when the borrower￿ s income is I, V L (I), is the value of the
following constrained maximization problem:
max
R;K;D0 R + E
￿
￿K + ￿EWL (F(K);D0)
￿
s.t. I ￿ R + ￿EWB (F(K);D0) ￿ I; I ￿ R.
Since WL is determined by V L, this may seem to be a standard stochastic dynamic programming
problem. However, the constraint, in particular WB, is also in￿ uenced by V L. As a result,
Blackwell￿ s conditions fail to hold for the corresponding ￿xed-point operator. The operator is
non-monotonic. Hence, we cannot use the usual techniques to guarantee existence. This is also
the reason why we were unable to establish uniqueness of the equilibrium.
The argument of the existence proof is the following. First, we show that the potential candi-
dates for V L are contained in a convex, compact set, called ￿. Then, we construct a ￿xed-point
operator, T, as follows. For each element of ￿, say g, using Proposition 2, (7), (8), Lemma 2 and
Proposition 3, we construct the rest of the value functions, V B
g , WL
g and WB
g , as if g were the
true V L. Then, we de￿ne Tg (I) as the value to the monopolistic lender solving a maximization
problem if the borrower￿ s income is I, assuming that the value functions are WL
g and WB
g . Finally,
we show that this operator has a ￿xed point, and any ￿xed point determines an equilibrium.
24First, all of the value functions can be bounded between zero and the discounted present value











sf (KFB)dG(s) ￿ KFB
￿
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= 0 on [M;1)
￿
:
Recall from Lemma 1 that we know the monopolistic lender￿ s value function is increasing and
concave, with slope less than one. If the income of the borrower exceeds M, then the monopolistic
lender is clearly unable to o⁄er a contract that speci￿es R = I, because the discounted present
value from a contract cannot exceed M. Therefore, from Lemma 4 and Remark 1 it follows that
V L0 = 0 on [M;1). Hence, if there exists an equilibrium, V L ￿ V L (0) 2 ￿. Observe that ￿




, is a convex, compact set. We are going to de￿ne a ￿xed-
point operator on ￿. The reader should think of the function g 2 ￿ as a potential candidate for
V L ￿ V L (0).







(From (7), K0 (g) would be the investment made by the monopolist lender if g = V L ￿V L (0) and













(From (9), V B
g (0) would be V B (0) if g = V L￿V L (0).) Since ￿ < 1, V B
g (0) is well-de￿ned. De￿ne
V B





g (0) if I ￿ V B
g (0);
I otherwise.
Furthermore, de￿ne V L
g (0) by the following equation:
V L









g (0) would be V L (0) if g = V L ￿ V L (0).) De￿ne V L
g (I) = V L
g (0) + g (I).
Finally, we are ready to determine the competitive value functions as if g were V L ￿ V L (0).
First, let Hg (x) be described by the following equations, in the spirit of Proposition 3:
Hg (x) = V B
g (I0);
25where V L
g (I0) ￿ I0 = ￿x. Given V L
g and V B
g , one can de￿ne WL
g (I;D) and WB
g (I;D) by
WL









Hg (I ￿ D) if D < V L
g (I)
V B
g (I) if D ￿ V L
g (I):



















Notice that T0g (I) would be the value to the monopolistic lender if the value functions were WL
g
and WB
g and he could use only deterministic contracts. For some values of income, the lender
might be better o⁄ randomizing between optimal deterministic contracts at di⁄erent income levels
such that (15) is satis￿ed in expectation. Hence, to ￿nd the generated value function of the lender,
one must consider the convex hull of T0g. De￿ne the ￿xed-point operator T : ￿ ! ￿ as follows:
Tg = conc(T0g) ￿ (conc(T0g))(0),
where conc denotes the concavi￿cation of a function. To see that T indeed maps into ￿; one might
show that Tg is continuous and concave with slope less than one, and that (Tg)(0) = 0. The
concavity of Tg and (Tg)(0) = 0 follow immediately from the construction. The continuity of Tg
and the conclusion that its slope is less than one follow from the proof of Lemma 1.
Proposition 4 (i) The operator T has a ￿xed point.
(ii) There is a bijection between ￿xed points and equilibria.
(iii) Autarky is not an equilibrium.
Proof. (i) We apply Schauder￿ s Fixed-Point Theorem to the operator ￿. As we mentioned, the
set ￿ is a convex, compact set. It remains to show that the operator T is continuous with respect
to the supremum norm. This would clearly follow from the continuity of T0. Notice that the
functionals K0 (g), V B
g (0) and V L
g (0) are all continuous in g. The function Hg is also continuous.
Hence the value functions WL
g and WB
g are continuous. Therefore the maximand in (14) and the
constraint (15) are both continuous. Thus T0 is a continuous operator.
(ii) If g = V L ￿ V L (0), where V L is an equilibrium value function of the lender, then g is
obviously a ￿xed point of T. If g is a ￿xed point of T, then it follows from the proof of Theorem
9.2 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) that V L, where V L ￿ V L (0) = g, corresponds to an equilibrium.
(iii) Suppose, to the contrary, that autarky is an equilibrium. This would mean that there is
an equilibrium where V L ￿ 0, and that g ￿ 0 is a ￿xed point of T; by part (ii) of this proposition.
26To get a contradiction, we show that (T0g)(I) > 0 whenever I is large enough, in particular if
I ￿ ￿
R 1
0 sf (KFB)dG(s). If g ￿ 0; then K0 (g) = 0, WL
g ￿ 0, and V B
g (I) = WB
g (I;D) = I. Then












If I is large enough, R = ￿
R 1







The solution is clearly KFB, and the feasibility constraint is indeed satis￿ed if I ￿ ￿
R 1
0 sf (KFB)dG(s).
Therefore (T0g)(I) = ￿KFB + ￿
R 1
0 sf (KFB)dG(s) > 0.
7 Numerical Computations
We have not been able to analytically characterize the time series properties of our equilibria.
The goal of this section is to compute a numerical example and identify correlation coe¢ cients of
di⁄erent variables. We provide intuitions behind these results and compare them with empirical
facts on emerging market economies in the next section. Our purpose is merely to investigate
whether the predictions of our model are qualitatively consistent with data, not to perform a
serious calibration.
Below we present the computational results for a uniform productivity shock, the production
function f (K) = 2K:75 and the interest rate r = 1=￿￿1 = 0:1. To ￿nd a ￿xed point of the operator
T de￿ned in the previous section, we use the value function iterations approach. Starting with an
arbitrary function g0 2 ￿, we compute g1 = Tg0; g2 = Tg1, etc., and iterate until kgn ￿ gn￿1k ￿ "
for " su¢ ciently small. We have no analytical result guaranteeing that such an algorithm converges.
However, we obtained convergence every time the program was run, with di⁄erent initial guesses,
and the ￿xed point seems to be unique.
Next we describe the value and policy functions. Then we analyze the generated time series.
The reader who is only interested in the time series can skip the following subsection and go to
the next subsection.
7.1 Solution to the Monopolist￿ s Problem
In this subsection we describe numerically computed monopolistic value functions, V B (I) and
V L (I); and the corresponding policy functions of investment and the next period￿ s debt, K (I) and
D0 (I). From Proposition 3, the competitive contract at state (I;D) is (R(I0) ￿ I0 + I;K (I0);D0 (I0));




and I0 = H (I ￿ D). This
27gives us the competitive policy functions. The competitive value functions are WB (I;D) = V B (I0)
and WL (I;D) = D:
Monopolistic Value Functions
Figure 3 plots the monopolistic value functions, V B (I) and V L (I). As Lemma 2 claims, from
0 to V B (0) the borrower￿ s value function is constant (equal to V B (0)), and from V B (0) on, the
borrower￿ s value function is just the borrower￿ s income. The shape of the lender￿ s value function





, then gradually becomes ￿ at, and the slope becomes zero exactly at I = IM:
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Figure 3. Monopolistic value functions.
Monopolistic Policy Functions
We now describe the equilibrium contracts o⁄ered by the monopolistic lender as a function
of the borrower￿ s income. Recall that the more income the borrower has, the more di¢ cult it is
for the lender to fully extract the income. The lender has two instruments to extract an increase
in income through current repayment: He either increases the investment or decreases the next
period￿ s debt. In what follows, we analyze how the lender uses these instruments as a function of
the borrower￿ s income.
Figure 4 shows the monopolist￿ s choice of investment and the next period￿ s debt as functions of
income. These functions are de￿ned as if only deterministic contracts were allowed, but the value
functions are generated by potentially random contracts. At the end of this subsection, we explain
how the lender randomizes among these contracts.
On the investment graph, the upper horizontal line corresponds to the ￿rst-best investment
level, and the lower horizontal line to K0. The thick black line plots K (I). On the debt graph,
the thick black line corresponds D0 (I). The gray line depicts V L (f (K (I))). Notice that if the
next period￿ s debt is V L (f (K (I))) or higher, the lender will have monopoly power in the next
period for sure. Whenever D0 (I) < V L (f (K (I))), the borrower will have access to competitive
28markets in the next period with positive probability. The di⁄erence between V L (f (K (I))) and
D0 (I) should be interpreted as the debt reduction. The thin solid line corresponds to V L (0). If
the next period￿ s debt lies below this level, the borrower surely avoids debt overhang in the next
period.
















































. As we have shown, when the borrower￿ s income is zero, the lender
receives no up-front payment but still invests a positive amount of capital, K0. The investment
is smaller than the socially e¢ cient level, since the lender ignores the value of investment to the
borrower. (See Theorem 1.) Notice that K0 is the smallest investment the lender ever makes.
Since the borrower cannot compensate the lender for a debt reduction, the next period￿ s debt, D0,
is set to V L (f (K0)). This means the lender remains a monopolist next period no matter what









. It turns out that reducing debt only marginally is never pro￿table
to the lender. This is because the borrower would regain access to the competitive market with only
a very small probability, so providing more investment is a better way to increase the borrower￿ s
continuation value. As a result, if a debt reduction ever occurs, it has to be a discrete change.





lender uses only investment to extract the borrower￿ s income, and the next period￿ s debt is always
so high that the lender surely keeps his monopoly power. For income levels su¢ ciently close to I1,
the investment is actually higher than KFB.
￿The interval [I1;I2]. The lender uses only debt reduction to extract income from the borrower
on this interval. As a matter of fact, the investment falls with income, because debt reduction is
a more e¢ cient tool to extract the borrower￿ s income. Since there is a discontinuous drop in D0
at I1, there is also a discontinuous drop in investment in order to keep V B continuous. The curve
D0 (I) lies strictly between the curves V L (0) and V L (f (K (I))) on this interval. This means that
if the next period￿ s income is high, the borrower regains access to the competitive credit market,
but if the next period￿ s income is low, the incumbent keeps his monopoly power.
￿ The interval [I2;1). As income rises beyond I2, D0 (I) falls below V L (0). That is, the
borrower returns to competition for sure. On this interval, the lender uses both instruments to
extract additional income from the borrower. The next period￿ s debt decreases with income, and
investment increases with income. Eventually the next period￿ s debt reaches zero. Investment con-
tinues to rise shortly after that, until IM, where investment settles at KM (> KFB): No additional
surplus can be extracted from that point on, so the policy functions are constant to the right of
IM:
￿Randomization. So far we have analyzed the monopolist￿ s decisions as if only deterministic
contracts were allowed. The discrete jump in the policy functions at I1 translates into non-concavity
of the lender￿ s value function. Therefore, around I1 the monopolist will use random contracts to
achieve a higher expected value. It turns out that the left end of the interval of non-concavity, I, is
just to the left of the income level where investment intersects with the ￿rst-best level. The right




, the lender o⁄ers a random contract














. The lender uses only deterministic contracts everywhere else.
Along the equilibrium path, the maximum possible level of the next period￿ s income realization
under monopoly is ^ I = f (K (I)). In other words, in the presence of debt overhang, tomorrow￿ s
income realizations to the right of ^ I are o⁄ the equilibrium path. In particular, the monopolist
never forgives the debt in full, and the repayment is always equal to the borrower￿ s income (so
that consumption is zero).
7.2 Time Series
This subsection presents the results of time series simulations of the model. Starting from the
initial condition I = D = 0 and generating a random sequence of productivity shocks, we calculate
the resulting paths of the main variables using the policy functions described above. The numerical
30results are based on simulating our model for 100,000 periods. The graphs in this section show
only the ￿rst 80 periods of this simulation.
Figure 5 plots the time series of productivity shocks, output, consumption of the borrower,
investment and debt. The black dots appear at the top of each panel when there is monopoly, and
at the bottom when there is competition.
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Figure 5. Time series.
￿Market Structure. Figure 5 shows how the structure of the credit market ￿ uctuates between
the two regimes, as Theorem 3 predicts. The time series of shocks is highlighted in black during
periods of monopoly. Notice that debt overhang occurs after a sequence of bad shocks, and com-
petition is restored after good shocks. The proportion of time with monopolistic market structure
is 11:6 percent, and the average length of the monopolistic regime is 10:3 periods. A switch in
regime (from monopoly to competition or vice versa) occurs in 2:3 percent of the periods. There
are fewer monopoly periods than competitive periods because the borrower repays her debt as fast
as possible to avoid debt overhang.
￿ Consumption. The upper right panel shows the paths of the borrower￿ s income (in gray)
and consumption (in black). Observe that consumption is often zero. This is because whenever
31the borrower has positive debt, she prefers repaying her debt to consuming. This feature of the
equilibrium is merely the consequence of the assumption that the borrower is risk neutral.
￿Debt. The black line on the lower left panel shows the time path of the borrower￿ s debt, Dt.
The gray line depicts V L (It): The debt level is below V L (It) when the asset market is competitive.
If there is monopoly, Dt ￿ V L (It), the black line is above the gray line. Notice that even after the
borrower returns to competition, she continues to reduce her debt.
￿Investment. The lower right panel of Figure 5 plots investment over time. The two horizontal
lines again correspond to KFB and K0: On average, monopoly involves lower investment than
competition. The average investment during competition is 96:4 percent of the ￿rst-best level of
investment, KFB, and the average investment during monopoly is 45 percent of KFB. Notice that
periods of zero consumption during competition also involve lower investment. On the one hand,
the borrower has little income to pay for capital up front, and on the other hand, she does not
want to borrow too much because she does not want to accumulate debt.
￿Welfare. Figure 6 plots the time series of the welfare loss in percentage terms, computed as
(SSFB ￿ SS)=SSFB ￿ 100;
where SSFB denotes the ￿rst-best social surplus, achieved if the ￿rst-best investment is made every
period,






and SS is the social surplus in equilibrium,
SS (It;Dt) = WB (It;Dt) + WL (It;Dt):













Figure 6. Welfare loss relative to the ￿rst best.
The average welfare loss is about 2 percent. In other words, on average about 2 percent of
the present discounted value of the output stream is lost due to the ine¢ ciencies of this economy.
However, conditional on the monopoly regime, this loss is 12:1 percent, while conditional on com-
petition the loss is only 0:8 percent. Moreover, the investment graph of Figure 5 shows that the
welfare loss is almost solely due to underinvestment, not to overinvestment.
328 Empirical Evidence
8.1 Correlations
In this subsection, we report correlation coe¢ cients between certain variables for the time series
simulations described above and compare the results with stylized facts described in the literature.
Again, since the model parameters were chosen ad hoc rather than calibrated, the correlation
results should be viewed purely qualitatively. Table 2 presents the correlation coe¢ cients.
It Dt Kt Dt+1 Ct
Market structure indicator,
= 1=0 if monopoly/competition ￿:25 :83 ￿:86 :79 ￿:24
Investment, Kt :46 ￿:83
Next period￿ s debt, Dt+1 ￿:55 :90 ￿:85
Probability of debt overhang ￿:32 :80 ￿:83 :84 ￿:25
Country interest rate,
rt = Dt+1=(Dt + Kt ￿ Rt) ￿ 1 ￿:30 :73 ￿:77 :78 ￿:23
Consumption, Ct = It ￿ Rt :78 ￿:42 :36 ￿:49
Net borrowing, Kt ￿ Rt ￿:62 ￿:40
Table 2. Correlation coe¢ cients.
The ￿rst row of Table 2 shows the correlation coe¢ cient between the indicator of the market
structure (= 1 if monopoly and = 0 if competition) and other variables. In particular, the cor-
relation between the monopoly indicator and investment is ￿0:86: This is because monopoly is
associated with lower investment on average compared with competition. (See Theorem 1.) This
is consistent with empirical observations. Deshpande (1997) documents that the 1980s debt crises
were associated with a drastic fall in investment. In particular, for the HICs, investment declined
at an average annual rate of 5.3 percent from 1980 to 1987. Per capita investment fell by about
40 percent. Fischer (1987) reports that investment fell by 5 to 7 percent of GNP between 1981
and 1985 for some indebted countries. According to Borensztein (1990a), the average investment
to GDP ratio for 15 HICs was 18 percent in 1982-87, compared to a 24 percent average ratio in
1971-81. Furthermore, Arslanalp and Henry (2004) show that the countries that received debt
relief under the Brady deal between 1989 and 1995 experienced an investment boom soon after the
deals were made. The average growth rate of capital in these countries increased from 1.6 percent
per year ￿ve years before the debt relief, to 3.5 percent per year during the ￿ve years after the
debt relief. This evidence is consistent with our result that investment rises after a debt buyback.
The correlation coe¢ cient between investment, Kt, and the amount of debt, Dt; is ￿0:83. This
can partly be explained by the association of periods of monopoly power with higher debt levels.
(The correlation coe¢ cient between the indicator function for a monopoly period and current debt
is 0:83.) Also, as we have shown, investment is small during the monopoly regime. However, even
33during the competitive regime, investment is smaller when debt is larger, because the borrower uses
her money to repay debt instead of buying capital. Empirical studies have con￿rmed this negative
e⁄ect of debt on investment. For example, Arrau (1990) ￿nds this e⁄ect for the 1980s debt crisis
in Mexico. Borensztein (1990b) estimates a positive impact of debt reduction on investment in
the Philippines. Deshpande (1997) ￿nds a negative relationship between debt and investment for
13 heavily indebted countries between 1971 and 1991. Fry (1989) con￿rms this ￿nding for 28
developing countries that were highly indebted to the World Bank in 1986. Greene and Villanueva
(1991) show that the rate of private investment is negatively related to the debt-service ratio and
the ratio of debt to GDP in a sample of 23 developing countries over the period 1975 to 1987.24
Due to low investment, income is also low under the monopoly regime. The correlation coef-
￿cient between the income of the borrower, It, and the monopoly indicator is ￿0:25. Arslanalp
and Henry (2004) report that after debt relief, the Brady countries experienced a sharp rise in per
capita GDP growth rates, in line with this prediction. In addition, our result is consistent with
the observation that sovereign debt crises result in output losses. Sturzenegger (2004) provides
evidence from growth regressions for a large sample of developing countries and ￿nds that coun-
tries that defaulted in the 1980s experienced lower GDP growth compared with those that did
not default. The author estimates an accumulated 4 percent drop in output over the immediately
following four years.
There is a positive relationship between investment, Kt, and the income of the borrower, It; the
corresponding correlation coe¢ cient is :46. When the borrower has more income, she can a⁄ord
more investment. Similarly, when income is higher, the borrower is more likely to be able to a⁄ord
the next period￿ s debt reduction if there is monopoly, and to repay debt if there is competition.
The correlation coe¢ cient between It and Dt+1 is negative: ￿0:55.
Many authors have argued that a large amount of debt increases the probability of default and
hence must be associated with higher risk premia. Recent papers that discuss this issue include
Arellano (2005) and Yue (2005). Empirical support for this argument includes, for example,
Edwards (1984), who estimates a positive e⁄ect of the debt-output ratio on the country interest
rate spread over LIBOR for 19 countries between 1976 and 1980. Edwards (1986) con￿rms this
￿nding using data on Eurocurrency loans granted to 26 developing countries and on bonds issued
by 13 developing countries during the same time period. Our model also generates a negative
relationship between debt and country risk. Higher debt today makes debt overhang tomorrow
more likely. (The correlation between Dt and probability of debt overhang next period is 0:80.)
This in turn raises the risk premium on the country￿ s loans. (The correlation between Dt and
the country interest rate is 0:73.) In addition, Edwards (1984) ￿nds that country bond spreads
are negatively related to gross domestic investment over GDP. The author￿ s explanation is that
24Cohen (1993) disagrees that large debt is a predictor of low investment. However, Deshpande (1997) argues that
a negative e⁄ect of debt burden on investment is expected to operate only for countries experiencing debt overhang
(the severely indebted countries). Cohen￿ s sample includes 81 developing countries, many of which, presumably, do
not experience debt overhang.
34higher investment indicates that the country has good prospects for future growth, which should
decrease the probability of default and hence the risk premium. Consistent with this ￿nding, we
￿nd a strong negative correlation between investment and the country interest rate: ￿0:77.
A number of studies document that default risk and default premia are highly countercyclical
in emerging economies. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) report countercyclicality of real interest rates
for Argentina (1983-2001) and Brazil, Mexico, Korea and the Philippines (1994-2001). The authors
￿nd that eliminating country risk would lower Argentine output volatility by around 27 percent.
Uribe and Yue (2003) also document a negative relationship between country spreads and output
for Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines and South Africa over the period
1994 to 2001. Estimating a VAR model, they ￿nd that country spread shocks explain 12 percent
of movements in output, and output explains 12 percent of the movements of country interest
rates.25 Cline (1995), Cline and Barnes (1997), and Edwards (1984) ￿nd that GDP growth is a
signi￿cant determinant of country spreads in developing countries. In our simulations, we obtain a
correlation coe¢ cient of ￿0:30 between the borrower￿ s income and the country interest rate, and
a correlation coe¢ cient of ￿0:32 between income and the probability of debt overhang.
Our model also generates a negative correlation between consumption and the country interest
rate (￿0:23), consistent with empirical observations. For example, Arellano (2005) reports it for
Argentina for the last decade. She also documents that the dynamics of interest rates, consumption,
output and current account around the 1999 default episodes in Russia and Ecuador are similar
to those in Argentina.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2004a,b), Arellano (2005) and Yue (2005) suggest that an empirical
regularity of emerging market economies, in particular Argentina, is a countercyclical current
account. In other words, countries tend to borrow more (and at lower interest rates) in booms
than in recessions. The models of Aguiar and Gopinath (2004a) and Yue (2005) introduce persistent
shocks. Hence, when the borrower receives a good endowment shock, her permanent income rises
by more than her current income, which induces her to borrow in order to smooth consumption. In
our model, good shocks are associated with higher investment. However, net borrowing, Kt ￿ Rt,
is negatively correlated with output. (The correlation coe¢ cient is ￿0:62.) This is because the
borrower always wants to repay her debt, and in good states the borrower can a⁄ord to repay more.
However, the shocks in our setup are i.i.d. Introducing persistence in the shock process would have
two e⁄ects. First, a high shock today would predict a high shock tomorrow, which would make
investment in the current period more productive. This would induce higher investment and higher
borrowing. Second, higher income today would translate into higher future expected income, which
would decrease the threat of debt overhang. The borrower could then choose to delay part of the
debt repayment and use her income to buy more capital. This again would increase net borrowing.
Our conjecture is that persistence in productivity shocks can result in more borrowing in good
25Aguiar and Gopinath (2004a), Arellano (2005) and Yue (2005) build models that match the countercyclicality
of country interest rates in the Argentine economy.
35states, but for reasons other than consumption smoothing, in contrast to the existing literature.
8.2 Debt Reductions After a Sequence of Good Shocks
One of the predictions of our model is that the debt reductions occur after a sequence of good
shocks, see Remark 2. In this subsection, we show that empirical evidence supports this prediction.
The Brady Plan
One major example of debt relief is the Brady Plan announced in 1989 in response to the
1980s sovereign debt crisis. This plan resulted in debt-reduction deals for 18 countries during
the following decade. The 1980s debt crisis was caused mainly by worldwide events in the 1970s
and 1980s, including oil price shocks, high interest rates, recession in industrial countries and low
commodity prices. The HICs accumulated debt overhang, and the crisis became apparent when in
1982 Mexico announced that it could not honor its debt obligations. From 1982 to 1988, debtor
countries and commercial bank creditors engaged in repeated rounds of debt rescheduling that
proved useless in solving the sovereign debt crisis.
In 1989, U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady announced a plan that encouraged the credi-
tors to engage in voluntary debt-reduction schemes. Existing loans were swapped for either discount
bonds (lesser face value but with a market-based ￿ oating rate of interest) or par bonds (equal face
value but with a ￿xed, below-market interest rate). Both types of bonds had a 30-year matu-
rity. The principal and interest of the new bonds were securitized by U.S. Treasury bonds. In
some cases, commercial banks and multilateral agencies provided new loans. Brady bonds were is-
sued by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ivory
Coast (C￿te d￿ Ivoire), Jordan, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Uruguay,
Venezuela and Vietnam. The total face value of the Brady bonds was more than $160 billion. A
typical deal resulted in forgiving 30 to 35 percent of a country￿ s debt.26
In accordance with our model, we view the time when the counties were unable to service their
debt as the period of debt overhang and monopoly power. To see whether our theory￿ s prediction
that a debt reduction occurs after a sequence of good shocks holds in this case, we look at the
real GDP growth rate of the 18 countries that issued Brady bonds. Di⁄erent countries received
debt reductions in di⁄erent years, between 1990 and 1998. We average the growth rates of these
countries such that the last year in each country￿ s time series is the year when the Brady deal
was made for that country. We plot the obtained average growth rate in Figure 7. Notice how
growth is higher a few years before the Brady deal, just as the model predicts. The average real
GDP growth rate of the Brady countries three years before the debt relief deal was 4:1 percent,
compared with 1:8 percent during the six years preceding those three years, a di⁄erence of 2:3
percent. Case by case, the experience in more than two-thirds of the countries is consistent with
the model￿ s prediction. In addition, for 8 out of the 18 countries, the di⁄erence in average growth
26For a discussion, see Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2003), and Vasquez (1996).
36rates between the last three years before the deal and the preceding six years exceeds 3:3 percent.








Brady countries: real GDP average growth rate
Year relative to the deal
Figure 7. Real GDP average growth rate of the 18 Brady countries. Data source: UN.
2005 Argentine Debt Swap
The most recent sovereign debt reduction, and the largest in history, is the 2005 Argentine debt
swap deal. In December 2001, after four years of deepening recession, Argentina￿ s government
ceased all debt payments. After three years of default, Argentina made an o⁄er that would involve
a 70 to 75 percent reduction in the net present value of its debt, provided at least 70 percent of
the bondholders agreed with the arrangement. The $102.6 billion debt swap closed on February
25, 2005, and was the largest write-down in the history of sovereign restructurings.
Looking at Argentina￿ s real GDP growth rate (Figure 8), one can see that 2003 and 2004 are
the years of good shocks, following our model￿ s language. During these two years, real GDP in
Argentina grew at 8 percent, compared with an average of ￿4:9 percent during the years 1999 -
2002, a di⁄erence of almost 13 percent. Again, just as our theory predicts, the debt relief follows
a sequence of good shocks.
The Brady deal and the recent debt swap by Argentina empirically support our model￿ s pre-
dictions that the borrower achieves a debt reduction after favorable shocks.27 This observation is
in sharp contrast to the predictions of the rest of the literature on sovereign debt renegotiation.
Most of the existing models assume that once the borrower decides not to serve debt in full, the
parties engage in bilateral renegotiation. Since there is no delay in bargaining, the debt reduction
agreement is achieved immediately. Hence these models predict that the debt reduction occurs
when the borrower cannot repay the debt, that is, after a sequence of bad shocks.
27Russia provides another example of a substantial increase in GDP growth a few years before debt relief. In 2000,
after two years of rapid GDP growth, the London Club forgave about 50 percent of the present value of Russia￿ s
debt.
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Figure 8. Argentina￿ s real GDP growth rate. Data source: IMF.
9 Discussion
The main idea of this paper was based on the observation that accumulated debt is sunk cost for the
incumbent lenders but not for new potential lenders. This asymmetry gives ex-post market power
to the incumbents. Our goal was to explore the consequences of this phenomenon for ￿nancial
contracting. Our main result is that the structure of the asset market keeps changing over time.
In particular, even if the incumbents have monopoly power over the borrower, they ￿nd it optimal
to let the borrower have access to the competitive credit market in a future date. This seems to be
particularly relevant in explaining defaults and debt reductions in the context of sovereign lending.
Our model captures a fundamental con￿ ict between the borrower and the lenders. On the one
hand, the borrower needs the capital of the lenders; on the other hand, the borrower receives the
realized income. The marginal value to the monopolist lender of additional income for the borrower
is less than one, because it is costly for the lender to extract income from the borrower. Therefore,
in general, the monopolist lender invests less than the socially e¢ cient amount. Because of this
ine¢ ciency, the borrower wants to avoid debt overhang by repaying her debt as fast as possible.
The borrower￿ s marginal value of income is bigger than one, because she can use extra income
to lower her debt. By lowering debt, the borrower may avoid debt overhang and can make more
e¢ cient investment decisions than the lenders would.
The borrower￿ s large marginal value of income, which is also her marginal value of debt reduc-
tion, explains our main result. If the borrower has enough liquidity, the monopolist lender can
extract income from her by reducing debt. Since the lender￿ s marginal value of debt is one, which
is less than the marginal value to the borrower, the monopolist lender can extract more current
repayment from the borrower than the lender￿ s loss due to a debt reduction.
Two assumptions were essential in obtaining our results. First, the contracts in our model are
incomplete. Although we assumed that debt cannot be contingent on the realized income at all,
what we really need is that debt cannot be perfectly indexed by the shocks. This would already
imply that debt overhang can be accumulated, in turn giving market power to the incumbents.
38Second, we assume that the incumbent lenders can coordinate their actions. Indeed, we model the
incumbents as a single agent. We believe that neither of these assumptions is far-fetched.
Our model can be interesting in the contexts of both sovereign and corporate lending. Nonethe-
less, we have applied it only to sovereign lending. We have shown that our computational results
are consistent with many empirical observations on emerging market economies. In addition, un-
like other papers, our model predicts that debt reductions should happen only after a sequence of
good shocks. We show this to be consistent with data.
One of our major goals in terms of future research is to analyze the role of international lending
institutions in the environments described above. As we have shown, the investment decisions in
our model are socially ine¢ cient. Therefore, the question naturally arises: Can an organization
such as the IMF intervene to reduce or eliminate the welfare loss?
10 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Suppose that I0 > I, and the contract accepted at I is (R;K;D0). Then,
if the income of the borrower is I0 the lender can o⁄er (R ￿ ";K;D0) to the borrower, where " > 0.
Since (R;K;D0) was accepted at I, it must satisfy (2) and be feasible at I. Hence, (R ￿ ";K;D0)
is feasible at I0. Furthermore,
I0 ￿ [R ￿ "] + ￿EWB (F (K);D0) = I ￿ R + ￿EWB (F (K);D0) + [I0 ￿ I] + "
￿ I + [I0 ￿ I] + " > I0;
where the weak inequality follows from (R;K;D0) satisfying (2) at I. But the above inequality
chain shows that the borrower is strictly prefers accepting the contract (R ￿ ";K;D0) to defaulting
at I0. The lender￿ s payo⁄from this contract would be V L (I)￿", showing that V L (I0) ￿ V L (I)￿".
Since this is true for all " > 0, V L (I0) ￿ V L (I) follows.
(ii) Suppose that ￿ > 0, and the contract accepted at I +￿ is (R;K;D0). Then, the lender can
o⁄er the contract (R ￿ ￿;K;D0) at I. Since (R;K;D0) is feasible at I +￿, (R ￿ ￿;K;D0) is feasible
at I. Notice that
I ￿ (R ￿ ￿) + ￿EWB (F (K);D0) = I ￿ R + ￿EWB (F (K);D0) + ￿
￿ I + ￿ > I,
where the weak inequality holds because (R;K;D0) satis￿es (2) at I + ￿. The above inequality
chain shows that the borrower strictly prefers accepting (R ￿ ￿;K;D0) to defaulting at I. The
lender￿ s payo⁄ from this contract is
R ￿ ￿ + E
￿
￿K + ￿WL (F (K);D0)
￿
= V L (I + ￿) ￿ ￿.
This shows that V L (I) ￿ V L (I + ￿) ￿ ￿.
39(iii) The concavity of V L follows from the assumption that random contracts are allowed.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, suppose that the incumbent o⁄ers the same contract at (I;D),
as the monopolist would at I. If the borrower accepted this contract, the incumbent￿ s payo⁄would
be V L (I). If the outsider o⁄ers a more attractive contract to the borrower, the incumbent would









. If the outsider lender does not of-
fer a contract and the borrower￿ s income is I, the incumbent lender can o⁄er the same set of
contracts as o⁄ered when the income is I and the debt is D. By the de￿nition of Markovian
equilibrium, the borrower accepts the same contract providing the lender with the same pay-





to show that WL (I;D) ￿ D. Suppose by contradiction that WL (I;D) < D, and the contract
accepted at (I;D) is (R;K;D0). Then the outsider could o⁄er a contract (R ￿ ";K;D0) where
" 2
￿
0;WL (I;D) ￿ D
￿
. This contract is feasible at (I;D) and the borrower strictly prefers it to
(R;K;D0) because " > 0. The outsider￿ s payo⁄ from this contract is clearly WL (I;D) ￿ D ￿ ",
which is strictly positive because " < WL (I;D) ￿ D. This contradicts to the hypothesis that the
equilibrium contract was (R;K;D0).
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Suppose that D < V L (I). First, notice that
D = WL (I;D) = R￿ + E
￿
￿K￿ + ￿WL (F (K￿);D￿)
￿
;
where the ￿rst equality follows from Proposition 2, and the second one from the de￿nition of WL.
This shows that (R￿;K￿;D￿) satis￿es (3) with equality. It remains to show that (R￿;K￿;D￿)
maximizes (4) subject to (3).
Suppose by contradiction that there is a feasible contract (R2;K2;D0
2), satis￿es (3), and is
strictly preferred by the borrower to (R￿;K￿;D￿). The problem can be that this contract is not
o⁄ered in equilibrium, in particular, the outsider cannot make a strictly positive pro￿t by o⁄ering
this contract. This implies that (3) must be satis￿ed with equality. If R2 < I, the outsider
could o⁄er (R2 + ";K2;D0
2) and if "(> 0) is small enough it would still be accepted, and would
provide the outsider with a strictly positive payo⁄. Hence, R2 = I. Similarly, D0
2 = V L (f (K2))
for otherwise, by Proposition 2, the outsider could achieve a strictly positive pro￿t by o⁄ering
a contract with a slightly higher next period￿ s debt28. Hence, if the outsider o⁄ers the contract
(R2;K2;D0
2), his payo⁄ would be
￿D + I + E
￿
￿K2 + ￿WL ￿
F (K2);V L (f (K2))
￿￿
= ￿D + I + E
￿
￿K2 + ￿V L (F (K2))
￿
:
Recall, that ￿K+￿EV L (F (K)) is strictly increasing on [0;K0] and strictly decreasing on [K0;1).
Therefore, if K2 6= K0, the outsider can change K2 marginally, such that the borrower￿ s value is







2 with probability 1 ￿ ", and D00
2 > D0
2 with
probability ". If " is small, the borrower still strictly prefers this contract to (R;K;D0).




I;K0;V L (f (K0))
￿
, and this contract would provide the outsider with
a payo⁄ of I + V L (0) ￿ D. By Lemma 1, I + V L (0) must be equal to V L (I), and hence the
outsider payo⁄ would be V L (I) ￿ D. Since (R2;K2;D0
2) satis￿es (3) it follows that D = V L (I),
a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose now that D ￿ V L (I) and the equilibrium contract is (R￿;K￿;D￿). Then it must
satisfy (2). Suppose by contradiction that (R￿;K￿;D￿) does not maximize (5) subject to (2).
Then, there exists a contract (R2;K2;D0
2) satisfying (2) and
R2 + E
￿
￿K2 + ￿WL (F (K2);D0
2)
￿
> R￿ + E
￿
￿K￿ + ￿WL (F (K￿);D￿)
￿
.
The reason why this contract might not be o⁄ered in equilibrium is that the borrower is indi⁄erent
between accepting it and defaulting, and would choose to default. Let ￿ denote the di⁄erence
between the two sides of the previous inequality. Consider a contract (R2 ￿ ";K2;D0
2); where
" 2 (0;￿). Since (R2;K2;D0
2) satis￿es (2) the borrower strictly prefers accepting the contract
(R2 ￿ ";K2;D0
2) to defaulting. Furthermore, this contract generates strictly higher payo⁄ to the
lender than (R￿;K￿;D￿) because " < ￿. This shows that (R￿;K￿;D￿) cannot be an equilibrium
contract.
Proof of Claim 1. It is obviously enough to show that d
R 1










Since v is concave, v0 (sI) is decreasing in I for all s 2 [0;1]. Hence the integral is also decreasing
in I.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose ￿rst, that I < V B (0). Then the contract
￿
I;K0;V L (f (K0))
￿
is feasible and would be accepted by the borrower. This is because the expected payo⁄ of the
borrower is exactly V B (0) which is larger than I. Can the incumbent achieve a higher payo⁄?
Suppose there is a feasible contract, (R;K;D0), generating a higher payo⁄ for the lender, that is,
R + E
￿
￿K + ￿WL (F (K);D0)
￿




￿K + ￿WL (F (K);D0)
￿
￿ ￿K0 + ￿EV L (F (K0)) + (I ￿ R)
￿ ￿K0 + ￿EV L (F (K0)) = V L (0),
where the second inequality follows from the feasibility of (R;K;D0). The left-hand side would









the lender could have achieved a (weakly) higher
payo⁄ by o⁄ering (0;K;D0) than with the contract
￿
0;K0;V L (f (K0))
￿
. This contradicts to the
41uniqueness of the equilibrium contract
￿






established in the body
text of the paper.
Suppose now that I ￿ V B (0). Notice that V B (I) ￿ I for otherwise the borrower defaults.






V B (I) = I ￿ R + ￿EWB (F (K);D0) > I.
If I > R, the monopolist incumbent could raise R and the contract would still be accepted. This
shows R = I. Similarly, D0 = V L (f (K)) for otherwise, by Proposition 2, the lender could increase
his continuation value by increasing the next period￿ s debt. The value to the lender is
I + E
￿
￿K + ￿WL ￿
F (K);V L (f (K))
￿￿
= I + E
￿
￿K + ￿V L (F (K))
￿
:
Recall, that ￿K+￿EV L (F (K)) is strictly increasing on [0;K0] and strictly decreasing on [K0;1).
Therefore, if K 6= K0, the lender can change K marginally, such that the borrower￿ s continuation
value is still larger than I but the lender￿ s value from the contract increases. Hence, K = K0 and
V B (I) = V B (0) ￿ I, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3. Notice that whenever D < V L (I), I0 in (10) is well-de￿ned (see Figure
1).




is (R;K;D0), where R ￿ I0. From the de￿nition of V L,
V L (I0) = R + E
￿
￿K + ￿WL (F (K);D0)
￿
.
Then the contract (R0;K;D0), where R0 = R ￿ [I0 ￿ I], satis￿es
R0 + E
￿
￿K + ￿WL (F (K);D0)
￿
= R + E
￿
￿K + ￿WL (F (K);D0)
￿
￿ (I0 ￿ I)
= V L (I0) ￿ (I0 ￿ I) = D,
where the last equality follows from (10). This means that the contract (R0;K;D0) satis￿es the the
zero-pro￿t condition for the outsider, (3), which is the constraint of the maximization problem of




, (R0;K;D0) is feasible
at (I;D). Therefore,
WB (I;D) ￿ I ￿ R0 + ￿EWB (F (K);D0)
= I0 ￿ R + ￿EWB (F (K);D0) = V B (I0),





It remains to show that WB (I;D) ￿ V B (I0). Suppose by contradiction that WB (I;D) >
V B (I0) and the contract accepted at (I;D) is (R;K;D0). Since (R;K;D0) is feasible at (I;D),




. Furthermore, (R + [I0 ￿ I];K;D0) would provide




. The incumbent￿ s payo⁄
would be
WL (I;D) + (I0 ￿ I) = D + (I0 ￿ I) = V L (I0);
where the ￿rst equality follows Proposition 2 and the second one from (10). Using the same
argument as the one in the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 1, R + [I0 ￿ I] = I0, D0 = V L (f (K)),
and K = K0. But then WB (I;D) = V B (0) ￿ V B (I0), a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3. From (11) and the derivative rule for inverse functions it follows that
H0 (I ￿ D) = V B0 ￿
Q￿1 (I ￿ D)
￿ 1







= V B (0) ￿ V L ￿
V B (0)
￿
= V B (0) ￿
￿
V L (0) + V B (0)
￿
= ￿V L (0) ￿ ￿
￿
V L (I) ￿ I
￿
< I ￿ D:




established in the proof of
Lemma 2. The weak inequality follows from parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1, and the last inequality
follows from D < V L (I). Since Q is increasing, Q￿1 (I ￿ D) is strictly larger than V B (0). Hence,
from Lemma 2 we know V B0 ￿
Q￿1 (I ￿ D)
￿
= 1. From the de￿nition of Q and (10), Q￿1 (I ￿ D) =
I0. Therefore H0 (I ￿ D) = 1=
￿
1 ￿ V L0 (I0)
￿
. From part (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1, V L0 2 [0;1],
yielding H0 (I ￿ D) ￿ 1. The concavity of V L (established in Lemma 1) and (12) imply the
concavity of H.
Proof of Lemma 4. Step 1: I ￿ V B (0). If I < V B (0), then obviously V L0 (I) = 1 and
R(I) = I. This is because the monopolist lender can o⁄er the contract
￿
I;K0;V L (f (K0))
￿
. Since
I < V B (0) the borrower strictly prefers accepting it to defaulting. That is, the monopolist can
o⁄er the same contract as at I = 0, except that R = I instead of zero. Also notice that this contract
is optimal, since this contract provides the incumbent with a payo⁄ of V L (0) + I ￿ V L (I) by
part (ii) of Lemma 1. Notice that the contract
￿
I;K0;V L (f (K0))
￿
is a unique maximizer of (5)
subject to (2) for the following reason. Suppose the contract (R;K;D0) is also a solution to (5)








. Hence, K = K0 and




was shown to be unique in the text.
R = I immediately follows. By continuity, the equilibrium contract at
￿





V B (0);K0;V L (f (K0))
￿
.








I ￿ V B (0). Suppose by contradiction that V L (I) = V L ￿
V B (0)
￿
+ I ￿ V B (0). Let (R;K;D0) be








I ￿ V B (0)
￿
;K;D0￿
would solve (5) subject
to (2) at
￿
V B (0);V L ￿
V B (0)
￿￿
. This contract is also feasible at
￿




1, we established that the contract solving (5) subject to (2) is unique at
￿






V B (0);K0;f (K0)
￿
. Therefore, R = I; K = K0, and D0 = V L (f (K0)). But
I > V B (0) = ￿EWB ￿
F (K0);V L (f (K0))
￿
;




+I￿V B (0). Since V L is concave, V L0 (I) ￿
￿













Step 3: I 2 [IM;1). Suppose now, that the borrower has so large income, that R < I. Such
an I exists, since limK!1 f0 (K) = 0. Notice that D0 = 0 can be assumed since H0 ￿ 1 (as
















As we have shown, the unique solution to this problem is KM de￿ned by (13). Therefore, the
unique equilibrium contract is (IM;KM;0) whenever I ￿ IM. This shows that V L (I) = V L (IM)
whenever I ￿ IM, and hence V L0 = 0 on [0;1). Furthermore, V L (IM) = IM ￿ KM.
Step 4: I 2 [0;IM). Next, we show that if I < IM, then V L (IM) > V L (I). Suppose
by contradiction that V L (I) = V L (IM) and I < IM. Then, the contract accepted at I, must




. Also notice that this contract must specify R ￿




was shown to be unique, with
R = IM, a contradiction. Hence V L (IM) > V L (I). Therefore, the concavity of V L implies
V L0 ￿
￿
V L (IM) ￿ V L (I)
￿
=[IM ￿ I] > 0 on [0;IM).
Since V L0 (I) < 1 if I > V B (0) by step 2, and V L0 > 0 on [0;IM) by step 4, it follows that





Recall that H (I ￿ D) = V B (I0) = I0; where I0 ￿ V L (I0) = I ￿ D: From steps 1 and 2, and
(12) it follows that H0 (I ￿ D) > 1 if I0 = H (I ￿ D) < IM.
It remains to show that H0 (0) > 1. Notice that H (0) = I￿; where I￿ is de￿ned by V L (I￿) = I￿:
Since V L is concave, V L (0) > 0, and V L0 (I) = 0 if I > IM, I￿ is well-de￿ned. From the previous
paragraph we know that H0 (x) > 1 if H (x) < IM: Therefore, it is enough to show that I￿ < IM.
In step 3, we showed that V L (IM) ￿ IM = ￿KM. Since V L (I) ￿ I is decreasing (by V L0 ￿ 1), it
follows that I￿ < IM:
Proof of Remark 1. In step 1 of the proof of Lemma 4 we have shown that R(I) = I whenever




and the equilibrium contract is (R;K;D0), where




. This is because




. Hence, V L (I) = V L (R). Since
V L is increasing by part (i) of Lemma 1, this implies that V L0 = 0 on (R;I). This contradicts to




established in Lemma 4. In step 3 of the proof of Lemma 4 we have
also shown that R(I) = IM if I ￿ IM.
Proof of Theorem 3. (i) We prove this statement by contradiction. Suppose that a monop-
olist lender o⁄ers a sequence of contract which provides him with monopoly power forever. The
borrower￿ s consumption must sometimes be positive, for otherwise she would choose to default.
Therefore, with probability one there is a date, in which a contract of the following form is ac-
cepted: (R;K;D0); such that R < I and D0 = V L (f (K)). If I ￿ IM, then R(I) = I by Remark
1, a contradiction. If I ￿ IM, then the unique equilibrium contract is (IM;KM;0) (established in
the proof of Lemma 4). This contradicts to D0 = V L (f (K)).
(ii) First, we show that there exists an " > 0, such that whenever D < V L (I); in the equilibrium
contract EK > ". Suppose by contradiction that there exists a sequence (In;Dn)
￿
Dn < V L (In)
￿
,
such that in the corresponding contracts (Rn;Kn;D0
n), limn!1 EKn = 0. Notice that Rn;In ￿ IM
can be assumed and EDn; ED0
n ￿ V L (IM), therefore there is a subsequence of (n), (nk), such
that limnk!1 Ink = I￿, limnk!1 EDnk = ED￿, limnk!1 Rnk = R￿ and limnk!1 ED0
nk = ED0￿.
(Recall that limn!1 EKn = 0.) Then the contract (R￿;0;D0￿) is optimal at (I￿;D￿) by continuity.
(We do not claim that it is actually the equilibrium contract, but it must be payo⁄ equivalent.)
If there is no investment ever after accepting the contract (R￿;0;D0￿), then autarky would be
an equilibrium, a contradiction. Let t be the ￿rst date at which there is a contract (0;K2;D0
2)
accepted such that EK2 > 0. We show that the contract (R￿;K2;D0
2) is strictly preferred by the
borrower to (R￿;0;D0￿), and satis￿es (3) at (I￿;D￿). Hence, by Proposition 1, it cannot be payo⁄
equivalent to the equilibrium contract. The borrower￿ s payo⁄ is
I￿ ￿ R￿ + ￿
t+1EWB (F (K2);D0
2) < I￿ ￿ R￿ + ￿EWB (F (K2);D0
2),
because ￿ < 1 and EWB (F (K2);D0
2) > 0. Notice that E
￿
￿K2 + ￿WL (F (K2);D0)
￿
￿ 0,
otherwise the lender would not o⁄er (0;K2;D0




￿K2 + ￿WL (F (K2);D0)
￿
￿ R￿ + E
￿
￿K2 + ￿WL (F (K2);D0)
￿
:










, where K denotes the largest investment made. Hence the
borrower￿ s income is less than "=2 at least with probability ￿ in every period. But since the
investment is larger than ", the debt increases by at least "=2 in such periods if there was no debt
overhang. This is because if the debt is D in the current period and D0 in the next one,
D = R ￿ K + ￿EWL (F (K);D0) < "=2 ￿ " + D0
and hence D0￿D > "=2. Therefore with the probability of at least ￿
n, the debt becomes larger than
n"=2 after n periods. (This is because the shocks are independently distributed across periods.) Fix
45n such that n"=2 > V L (IM). Then, no matter what the current state (I;D) is, with probability
of at least ￿
n the borrower faces debt overhang n periods later. Since there are in￿nitely many
periods, one can conclude that the borrower faces debt overhang with probability one.
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